Still Speculation
Tuesday, May 9th, 2006 by SofiaMy response to Brooks’ views is that I am not fully convinced that we are machines. He is correct in saying that we still do not have a working definition of consciousness. That is because we have not yet been able to fully grasp scientifically how our brains work, how they produce minds that think, feel and (especially) have consciousness – science has not yet been able to reduce our minds and consciousness to the workings and mechanisms of physical particles. Although Brooks poses some valid criticisms to Searle, Chalmers and Penrose, and even if their arguments and predictions of “new stuff” that is still to be discovered, these three philosophers are at least correct in pointing to the fact that we have not yet figured out how the brain leads to (or causes) a human mind.
I do find Brooks convincing when he argues against the attempt to create centralized systems that organize perception and try to fit it into comprehensive mental maps. Brooks does persuade me when he claims that the most fruitful direction that AI can take right now is to focus instead on the robot’s or computer’s interaction with the world outside of it, in a more organic and decentralized manner.
Meanwhile, even though Searle might be a little too radical in his argument, there is some nerve that he touches in his article that resonates with things I have been thinking about throughout this class. One of the issues is related to simulation. When AI researchers work on computers and robots with the aim of having them pass the Turing Test, of producing artificial intelligence, and in the more ambitious cases of producing consciousness – the way in which they work and their goal is to simulate human intelligence. The simple fact of simulation raises (for me) a huge doubt as to whether such machines will EVER have real consciousness. Isn’t simulation by definition supposed to be just that – to come as close to while never reaching the real thing? Furthermore, and maybe more importantly, if scientists still have not figured it out what it is exactly in the brain that makes us humans conscious, then how can we be so sure that we could ever produce consciousness in anything else?
Even if Brooks is correct in pointing out that once we start building machines that interact with us in such a convincing manner that we start empathizing with them we will have to grant them a level of respect that comes closer to the respect we show other human beings, his view is NOT inconsistent with the fact that these machines, even if we greatly empathize with them, may not have consciousness in the way that we do. Our own empathy is no measure for an objective fact – it cannot be the answer to the question of whether or not the machines have consciousness. Brooks fiercely and constantly singles out the emotional desire to maintain our human specialness as the driving force behind arguments against the possibility of producing consciousness in machines. In order to be consistent, then, he should also factor out any emotional ability we might have to empathize with very advanced robots as a measure for whether they have consciousness. Neither our desire to be special nor our ability to empathize provide rigorous proof for the possibility of producing conscious machines. Alas, I am afraid any and all objective proof to support wither side is still missing, so the question remains wide open for speculation.