Searle vs. Brooks– Consciousness and The Mind
Tuesday, May 9th, 2006 by Lily CowlesInitially, when I wrote my reaction to “Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer Program?” I was pretty impressed by John Searle’s argument. He essentially stated that a computer might be able to pass the Turing Test, but that this test would not actually be a valid, or significant test of computer intelligence, because it does not test for comprehension, but merely the ability to simulate human behavior. In other words, Searle argues that computers may be able to be programmed to act like humans, but that they will never achieve the human level of consciousness that is inherent in our minds. All a computer will be able to do is recreate the behavioral patterns that we want it to. I thought he presented his ideas in an interesting, comprehensible manner, and I will admit that I was convinced of his argument. This was, however, before our class discussion, and before I read Rodney Brooks.
When we talked about the techniques and actual arguments that Seale made in class, I began to change my mind about what I consider Artificial Intelligence to be capable of, as well as how effectively John Searle argued against its possibility (or inevitability). He seemed to rely heavily upon this notion of the “Chinese room”, which seemed applicable to his argument at the time, but that I later had to question. He also provided no alternative for how one would test for his notion of human consciousness, arguing only against the Turing Test. This brought up a further concern: because he did not give the reader a definite way to test for his definition of intelligence, I was forced to wonder what his definition was at all. In fact, he never really gives one—besides saying that computers cannot comprehend the formal qua symbols we give them. Is understanding, then, necessary for intelligence? Searle never actually states his idea of what Artificial Intelligence would entail, but only proves, using a metaphor he himself created, that the definition presented by the Turing Test is insufficient. What a cop out.
After reading Rodney Brooks, I realized how shaky Searle’s argument really is. Brooks criticizes Searle’s “Chinese room,” and the idea that he could pass the Turing Test, although he would not understand Chinese. “Just as no single neuron in a Chinese speaker understands Chinese,” Brooks explains, “Searle, a component of the larger system, does not need to understand Chinese for the whole system to understand Chinese” (Brooks 179). After reading this, I realized where Searle may have made his biggest mistake: he thought that his own understanding inside the Chinese room would be the same as the larger whole of understanding in the Chinese room system. As Brooks explained, this isn’t how it works—with the human brain, or with computer programming. One small part of the system does not, and does not even need to, understand the big picture, so long as the whole system functions. Searle argues, “The way that human brains actually produce mental phenomena cannot be solely by virtue of running a computer program.” This distinction of a computer program and a mind (“mental phenomena”) is, however, refuted well by Brooks, who states that “the body is a machine that acts according to a set of specifiable rules”, which is exactly what a computer program is, and that the “mind is a product of the operation of the brain” (Brooks 173). In other words, Brooks argues that all we are all, in fact, machines, and that this notion of “mind” is exactly how a computer program works. Thus, if a computer could pass the Turing Test, it should be considered on the same level as human consciousness. According to Rodney Brooks, the problem with Searle’s argument, essentially, is that “he is afraid to give machines consciousness” (Brooks 180).
Well, I’m scared too, but I must admit that I definitely see where Brooks is coming from.