I Process, Therefore I Am
Wednesday, May 10th, 2006 by AlissaHaving read Brooks’ argument that humans are, technically speaking, the product of many simple machines working simultaneously as a “big bag of skin full of biomolecules interacting according to describable and knowable rules”, I have become more skeptical of Searle’s argument. At first I sided with Searle, agreeing with him that even if a computer were able to pass the Turing Test, which essentially measures the computer’s ability to trick a human into believing that it is a human, the computer still cannot be considered “conscious” because it is merely passing the test by mimicking humans. But the more I think about Brooks’ claims, the more I can side with Brooks’ notion that it is possible to create machines that imitate humans so well that there would be no way of telling the difference between the automaton and human unless you were told that behind the facial expressions and movements lie circuits and wires.
I find Brooks’ argument towards the end of his book fascinating because he speculates on the reasons why we are reluctant to admit that animals – and therefore machines – are capable of exercising the same level of consciousness that we are. Brooks assumes that if we continue advancing our robot technology, we will ultimately succeed in creating AI. To me, though, the true debate is whether or not Artificial Intelligence should really be labeled as “intelligence”. Searle’s contends that a machine will never really become “intelligent” because the man in the room never truly understands Chinese – he merely follows a set of rules that makes it appear as though he understands Chinese to the people outside of the room. Brooks makes an important refutation that this statement is ridiculous because each individual neuron inside someone who speaks fluent English does not even understand English.
Thus, we consider humans intelligent because they are able to produce thoughts as a result of a series of chemical reactions in the brain. Brooks uses this statement to reason that we should also be able to create a machine whose output feigns intelligence similar to that of a human. I concur with Brooks on this, however, I have trouble seeing how Chalmers, Penrose, and Searle were so outrageous in asserting that machines lack certain, indefinable “new stuff” that distinguish humans from other species. Just because science has yet to dub this “new stuff” with a scientific term does not mean that it is complete ludicrous.