Are We Machines?
Monday, May 1st, 2006 by AmaraAfter reading Searle’s article, I began to reconsider the feasibility of artificial intelligence. With his Chinese room example, he made concrete the difference between an understanding human and a thoughtless machine. What he repeatedly emphasized was that a computer could manipulate symbols to the point where it was indistinguishable from a human, but could attach no meaning to those symbols. He reiterated that “manipulating the symbols is not by itself enough to guarantee cognition, perception, understanding, thinking, and so forth” (26). Manipulation and simulation do not have real consequences, as suggested in this example Searle gives: “you could not run your car by doing a computer simulation, and you could not digest pizza by running the program that simulates such digestion” (29). Similarly, the simulation of cognition will not produce the effects of the neurobiology of cognition. Most of Searle’s points seemed to convince me that the goal of AI is unrealistic.
However, upon reading Brooks’ argument in Flesh and Machines, I came to question Searle’s objection to artificial intelligence and began to feel that AI is possible, at least to some extent. In Brooks’ chapter, “We Are Not Special,” he suggests that the human body is a machine: “the body consists of components that interact according to well-defined (though not all known to us humans) rules that ultimately derive from physics and chemistry” (173). Most humans bristle at the word “machine,” because of their desire to be “special” and to differentiate themselves from mere robots. Brooks’ concludes that we all “overanthropomorphize humans, who are after all mere machines” (175).
Because humans (who are themselves machines) possess emotions and consciousness, other machines should also be able to have such characteristics. To prove his point, Brooks dismantles Searle’s Chinese room argument. According to Brooks, it is absurd that Searle should conclude that machines cannot think merely because Searle himself cannot understand Chinese. Searle fails to realize that he is a component of a larger system, and that he alone does not need to understand Chinese for the whole system to understand Chinese. As a result, Searle’s argument against AI does not hold, in Brooks’ mind.
Brooks suggests that the basis for Searle’s argument along with those of others is the desire to preserve the specialness of the human being. Brooks suggests that if human beings accept that robots have a consciousness, these robots can no longer serve human beings as “slaves” and must rather be taken care of. Such points are interesting, but do not seem to be central to all arguments against AI. I have taken a position between that of Searle and Brooks, believing that AI is possible to a limited extent.