Searle is tricky
By Owen CornwallFriday, May 12th, 2006 at 6:34 pm
Searle’s argument frames an interesting question, but it does not eliminate any doubt or prove anything. It does not eliminate the specter that perhaps we can’t conceive of a complicated enough program that could mimic a brain. He poses a strange hypothesis that the brain has a special goo for giving meaning to ideas. Also, perhaps the program for having a strong AI would be conceivably much different than anything I can conceive with my knowledge of limited computer programs.
Also, you can take similar Chinese room experiments and change the parameters so that it does not seem as reasonable. If the brain was blown up to large proportions and a human was inserted into the brain to be in charge of a neuron, then that person would not understand the neuron inputs and outputs, but surely there is still consciousness in the brain. Therefore, it seems unreasonable to say that just because the guy in the Chinese room is just manipulating signals that there is no consciousness occurring.
My major problem with Searle’s article was that he was disguising his arguments regarding Philosophy of Mind in such a way as to make them relevant to computing, but also to take cheap shots at other Philosophers without necessarily making a thorough argument.
Also, though he does make some convincing arguments, his allusion to Occham’s razor rings somewhat hollow. It seems that the nature of the machine that most effectively simulates consciousness will probably be very complex and a degree of understanding removed from what we already think.