The Computational Universe

I would have to guess that most people, never having taken a class like ours, overestimate the capabilities of computers and specifically artificial intelligence by a lot. To begin with, it’s not an easily understood subject, and even as we have seen experts within the field cannot even agree on the capacities, now and in the future, of AI.

When we were asked to identify the main argument that Searle makes against AI I initially felt that his article really highlighted the difference between syntax and semantics. Perhaps that is what struck me as the most interesting point he made since for me, that really accentuates the difference between us humans who have the capacity for both while AI only syntax. After our class discussion, however, I realized that while that may be an issue, it’s not the real problem. The Turing test is the problem. Since the Turing test is used to try to determine the difference between human and AI behavior, it is in fact very possible that a computer could do something as well as a human and that an expert would not be able differentiate between the two. The real difference between human behavior and AI is the principle of thinking and the actual thought process that goes on in a human mind. This is just never going to be the same in AI, and the Turing test is thus not a valid test. Brooks approaches the topic from a very different perspective, which in my opinion is too simple. You cannot just look at a human as a body, you must realize how complex the mind is and realize that no form of AI will be able to replicate the intricacies of human thought process.

I do tend to agree with what I see as the main point of Searle’s article, as Professor Arora so aptly puts it, “so what if a computer passes the Turing Test”.  My main objection to  Professor Arora’s defense of AI is that it seems founded on observations that are trivial at best, incorrect or badly reasoned at worst. I raise the possibility that computers may respond logicially or correctly based on the structure or content of my questions, but not felicitously given te Gricean maxims, or other sociolinguistiic constraints which help us interpret human speech interaction; Professor Arora responds: assume one does; assume a computer responds entirely felicitously; that it’s answer to my sullen (and how would it even know I was sullen?) “some weather, huh?” is “are you feeling alright?” would I not ascribe it some level of consciousness.

Here I am inclined to disagree. I would not deem a computer conscious even if it could respond in this way. Quite to the contrary, I would still resist categorizing his device as a conscious being. Prof. Arora’s response is “how do you tell this apart from your friends? How do you judge them except by input/output responses?” Here is where the reasining becomes trivial in my mind–we judge everything rational through input/output reponses. There is no part of the world that we do  not analyze by what causes we create (or see created) and the effects they produce. But therer is more to the human experience of the world than rigidly rational cause/effect, input/output analysis. The irrational is in many ways our chief means of engaging with the world, much as we would like to think otherwise.

Professor Arora asserts that he could find a machine to be his friend, but could not marry it (or as I interpret, could not love it). But that is really the judge of consciousness to me…not a rational, text-based decision of “do I think this machine can process me felicitously”. Am I capable of loving this entity outside myself? Do I think that it could potentially satisfy me emotionally as well as intellectually? That is my Turing test. That is what would allow me to judge a computer conscious.

Having read Brooks’ argument that humans are, technically speaking, the product of many simple machines working simultaneously as a “big bag of skin full of biomolecules interacting according to describable and knowable rules”, I have become more skeptical of Searle’s argument.  At first I sided with Searle, agreeing with him that even if a computer were able to pass the Turing Test, which essentially measures the computer’s ability to trick a human into believing that it is a human, the computer still cannot be considered “conscious” because it is merely passing the test by mimicking humans.  But the more I think about Brooks’ claims, the more I can side with Brooks’ notion that it is possible to create machines that imitate humans so well that there would be no way of telling the difference between the automaton and human unless you were told that behind the facial expressions and movements lie circuits and wires. 

I find Brooks’ argument towards the end of his book fascinating because he speculates on the reasons why we are reluctant to admit that animals – and therefore machines – are capable of exercising the same level of consciousness that we are.  Brooks assumes that if we continue advancing our robot technology, we will ultimately succeed in creating AI.  To me, though, the true debate is whether or not Artificial Intelligence should really be labeled as “intelligence”.  Searle’s contends that a machine will never really become “intelligent” because the man in the room never truly understands Chinese – he merely follows a set of rules that makes it appear as though he understands Chinese to the people outside of the room.  Brooks makes an important refutation that this statement is ridiculous because each individual neuron inside someone who speaks fluent English does not even understand English. 

Thus, we consider humans intelligent because they are able to produce thoughts as a result of a series of chemical reactions in the brain.  Brooks uses this statement to reason that we should also be able to create a machine whose output feigns intelligence similar to that of a human.  I concur with Brooks on this, however, I have trouble seeing how Chalmers, Penrose, and Searle were so outrageous in asserting that machines lack certain, indefinable “new stuff” that distinguish humans from other species.  Just because science has yet to dub this “new stuff” with a scientific term does not mean that it is complete ludicrous. 

Mr. Rodney A. Brooks seems to suggest that by simply having more and more computing power eventually the computer will be able to completely replicate human behavior, and then there will be no one to say that computers are any less authentically intelligent than humans. Brooks is talking about robots, where Searle is talking about strong AI, which refers strictly to programs.Regardless, I think Searle’s statements have strong implications for Brooke’s views. Frankly, I think Searle gets it right. A computer is not even capable of addition if we do not make it capable of addition. A program manipulates symbols, and those symbols have no significance that we do not give them. There is a difference between syntax and semantics, and Brooks does not address how this will be overcome. The fact is that a program can be instituted by several types of hardware, but consciousness is the function of extremely specific wirings of neurons, whose very simple firings go on to produce higher level mental functionings. For a robot to think like a human, its “brain” could not simply be a program. Brains have causal relationships with their neurons, which have causal relationships with their environments. They are not forced to simulate syntax through symbol manipulation. There is an underlying connection, a consciousness. To make a robot with AI would require a duplication of the human brain, which means not only simulating it through a program, but actually replicating it in some way structurally, which may or may not be possible. Brooks seems to think that simply computing power is the key to intelligence, but in fact the brain actually has a form of structure to it that has little to do with computation. Lastly, I found Brooks’s talks about discrimination towards robots, and the somewhat ridiculous statements that his kids were little more than little robots (I could not impute a soul to a robot), to be somewhat discrediting, and frankly, I took Searle far more seriously.

In his article, “Is the Brain’s Mind a Computer Program?” Searle provides a very compelling argument to show that a computer program can never duplicate a human mind.  He readily allows that it is theoretically possible for a program to simulate the behavior and fool humans into believing that the responses, whether verbal from the chatbots or physically reactive from a robot like Kismet, are human, which would mean that the machines could pass the Turing test.  However, as Searle makes quite clear, the ability to pass the Turing test is not the same as thinking.

Yet, I believe that it would be a misinterpretation to declare that Searle is arguing that AI is impossible.  Rather, I believe that Searle is arguing that an attempt to reach AI solely through computer programming is foolhardy and doomed to failure.  Instead, we may interpret Searle to suggest that trying to separate the programming from the physical construct in which it is implemented is comparable, and equally incorrect, as attempting to draw a concrete distinction between the mind and the brain.  As he states, “It is best to see strong AI as one of the last gasps of this antiscientific tradition, for it denies that there is anything essentially physical and biological about the human mind.  The mind according to strong AI is independent of the brain.  It is a computer program and as such has no essential connection to any specific hardware.” (Searle, 31)  And this is precisely why Searle believes that the strong AI approach is plainly wrong.  He believes that it is wrong to separate the mind from the very real, physical substance that is the brain.  A computer program cannot replicate the mind because the mind is inextricably connected to the brain.  Thus, I believe that Searle does not deny the possibility that AI can be reached, but does so only on the condition that we acknowledge that AI requires an interaction comparable to the interaction between the brain and what we may more scientifically call consciousness.  A computer version of the human brain is needed.  Searle goes on to put a special emphasis on the uniqueness of the human brain and neuron.  This emphasis is hard to justify, but does not seem ridiculous to assume.

But, it is precisely this emphasis on the special properties of the organic human brain that Brooks contests.  He believes that it might be possible for silicon and steel to make a system that can function in a way similar to that of the brain.  And he presents an argument for it.  Whether or not we subscribe to this argument ultimately depends on our deeply ingrained beliefs about human existence.  Brooks makes no attempt to change these beliefs.

Thus, it is important that when we approach this issue we take Brooks’ point to heart.  We must not let our personal emotions and beliefs about whether or not we are simple machines completely cloud our judgment.  It is impossible for our beliefs not to sway us, but we should be conscious of this and endeavor to fully consider the opposite side.

With that said, I am currently inclined to side with Brooks.  I have no strong reason to believe that human beings are not machines, so I will not deny the possibility that silicon and steel could one-day duplicate human behavior and consciousness.  However, that day has not yet come, so I also see the point of Searle’s conclusion… at least for the moment.

         Unfortunately Will Smith plays a Science Fiction role in this particular movie. I enjoyed the cinematic adventure thoroughly and was completely enveloped by the idea of artificial intelligence until the credits began to roll. After this point I came back down to earth into the real world. I believe Brooks is still watching the credits or maybe he is a huge Will Smith fan.

I do not have much knowledge of machines or of the process in which they are built. I am also not hugely religious so my expectation of future technologies is not limited by these beliefs. However I do strongly feel that we are all individuals. The word “machine” to me broadcasts a huge sense of homogeneity and un-uniqueness. Brooks says that we are manufactured by society to have emotions and feelings. Surely this means that we have evolved throughout our lifetime to adapt to certain situations in the ways that current machines could not possibly ever hope to do. It is also my understanding that machines have to be programmed so that their reactions are equal to the stimulus that they are given and so surely this alone sets us apart from machines. We are given advice and rules on how we should behave and react in life however we can equally reject the advice and rules in favor of our own. It seems that there is something inherent in the nature of programming that prevents a machine from deviating from the orders that it is given and even if it does this must too be programmed.

In his critique of Searle he almost reduces his views to ridicule (which he himself criticizes as a form of critique) by using phrases such as “absurdly concludes” and “less sophisticated”. As we discussed in class this puts the reader in a position of severe distrust and doubt. Also as I agreed with Searle in his article and particularly his Chinese room argument I am inclined to disagree with Brooks.

I did however enjoy Brooks’ small entry on how we are special. I had not previously thought of how we classify the respect that we give to different animals in relation to their biological make-up. There is of course no rational reasoning for this but it is in fact human nature. Again I think that human nature is something we cannot re-produce without a sense of programming. Fear is something inherent in humans, not something that is programmed within us and I think it is important to make this distinction. Unless we think of ourselves as programmed from our initial conception I do not believe that Brooks has an argument. This notion is believe is “absurd”.

…..was the reaction I received when I was debating the subject of this blog with Lily Cowles. You can label it a reactionary formation to my liberal arts upbringing, or perhaps a consequence of some religious one, but there is something innate in me that will refuse to agree completely with Brooks. Emotion and creativity are the foundations of my argument.

Don’t get me wrong, I completely believe in the possibility of AI. However, the “artificial” part is what, I suppose, separates me from the ones in the “know.” After our class, Searle’s conclusions were much more evident to me. I originally picked statement number four for his main thesis, but now it is obvious that it is number two. He believes that computers can pass the Turing test but that it is not a valid one to see if a computer can think. I believe that one day all computers will eventually be able to pass the Turing Test but that it does not really reflect anything about consciousness and thinking at all. Thinking, to Searle, is not the mere manipulation of symbols that he describes in the “Chinese room” example. He talks about the importance of the meaning and emphasis that we place on things. But why is Brooks referring to Searle as confused?

Searle and Brooks obviously disagree on the value placed on humanity. Searle ascribes so much more meaning to synapse, neurons, and other impossible to duplicate processes of which Brooks completely disregards. Brooks sees the body as a machine that follows a set of standardized rules and procedure. Agreed. But I believe that there is something in our combination of rules and procedure that allows us at times to go against those same laws (self-preservation vs. suicide).

Brooks also attests to Searle a subconscious fear of alluding to computers as conscious. Searle concludes that “the way that human brains actually produce mental phenomena cannot be solely by virtue of running a computer program” (29). In conclusion, I guess I would never completely cancel out the possibility of creating a “human-like” computer with our technology in the future but at the same time, it will never be an emotive human-being.