InfoTech & Public Policy

Avi’s recent post “The New Ads” asserts the death of the 30 second ad and points to viral advertising as the new frontier in pushing products. While his points are well taken, focusing exclusively on the new forms that commercials will take as television moves online misses the larger picture: content, not just advertisements, is sure to evolve.

Between Tivo, Slingbox, piracy, ad-blockers, desensitization and competition from an ever-increasing array of media, it certainly looks like television producers are in for a rough period. Only very recently, with the introduction of itunes, the online broadcast of sports events and ABC’s next-day streaming of popular shows, have they started to take advantage the new distribution channels the internet offers. Even more nascent is the use of the internet to supplement media content.

ABC has been a pioneer in this area, particularly with Lost, its breakout hit, now in its second season. For the uninitiated, Lost follows a couple dozen survivors from the crash of Oceanic Airlines Flight 815, who are trapped on a mysterious island. When the show first launched, ABC created a web site for Oceanic Airlines complete with the ability to look up flights and make reservations to create buzz about the show. More recently, in anticipation of the summer break between seasons, ABC has launched “The Lost Experience,” a game set to run in parallel to the show that includes web sites, commercials airing during the show, billboards, phone calls and other interactive multimedia.  The show has also made a serious effort to have its cast and writers engage the fan-base by taking part in online forums and actively responding to feedback and theories about the show.

In a way, The Lost Experience can be seen as the direct descendent of Majestic, a PC game that EA introduced and then swiftly abandoned about 5 years ago. Majestic was a fully immersive mystery game; not only would you play around on the computer to try to figure things out, but the game would contact you by email, phone, fax and IM and would tailor its content to you specifically. For instance, the game might send you a handwritten, threatening letter that mentions your family by name. While Majestic proved to be staggeringly unpopular, largely a function of being too involved, it and its derivates represent the sort of total immersion that will likely become increasingly common as the internet enables new content, not just new ads.

I want to talk about the new Sprint Nextel cell phone tracking and alert system. Just recently Sprint began offering their new Family Locator Service for a certain set of Motorola/Samsung/Sanyo phones. If you have one of these phone and a Sprint service (or you can just sign up for a new contract), for an additional $9.99 parents can get detailed location information about where their children are.

The service allows one “parent” phone to make requests for four “children” phones. To setup tracking on the children phones, a request is sent to the phone notifying the user that this phone will be setup with this tracking service. The user has to confirm the request (with a confirmation number). I’m guessing that most parents who subscribe for this service would do this setup by themselves before handing over the cell phone to the child.

After the initial setup, the parent account can make a request to the service and view on a map the location of all four cell phones. This can either be viewed via a regular computer the Sprint website, or for certain phones, can be viewed directly on the parent cell phone.

Sprint made an interesting design choice to reduce some of the intra-family privacy issues when a request is made. If the Family Locator service can successful locate a child’s cell phone, that phone is sent a message notifying it that the parent phone has requested its location. This seems like it will at least prevent parents from secretly monitoring their children (I don’t have the service, but it does not look like it can be disabled). I imagine this kind of technology can cause a whole host of trust problems between the parents and children, but at least the tracking will be done openly.

Sprint also offers a Saftey Check feature. From the Sprint website, the parent account can setup a periodic tracking request to the children phones. If the phone is not within a specific area when the request is made, an alert is sent to the parent’s phone. This Safety Check is setup for situations like arriving at school safely or being home before curfew. I find it funny that Sprint FAQ recommend keeping the child’s phone on vibrate during the Safety Check times so the constant tracking notification does not interrupt classroom activities.

The Safety Check works with positive logic – ensuring that a child is within a certain area at a certain time. I think it would be easy to implement a feature that would check and only alert a parent if the phone is within one of the forbidden zones. I bet some parents would pay for the ability to setup a registered-sex offender or bad-influence-friend alert.

Sprint does specifically remind parents that the tracking only works when the phone is on. I think Sprint should also remind parents that this is only tracking the cell phone, not the child. It is very easy for the child to leave the tracking cell phone in school when he/she decides to cut class. The underlying technology is GPS when available and then cell phone tower locations. It is only as accurate as the technology it is using (from a few yards to a few hundred yards). This type of variation may make the houses nearest to the school the hottest party spots.

In class last week, we talked about the use of geo-location technologies with respect to directing emergency calls of someone using VoIP. A little looking into how these technologies are available and what they’re used for, and it seems that there are applications to many of the topics we’ve talked about this semester. When so much of the problem of internet governance stems from the anonymity of internet users and the ease with which internet traffic can transcend borders, knowing the location of an internet user changes the game.

First, let’s take a look at the geo-location technologies currently in use. A large part of the software used now is available from proprietary providers such as Quova and Digital Element. This proprietary software is based on determining the location of a particular IP address. This information has to be gathered by analyzing the locations of IP addresses all over the world. Note that while there are ways to conceal location (such as using a proxy server), the software can flag internet users who are doing so. Interestingly, another mechanism for determining physical geo-location without using IP addresses was patented in September, 2005. The patent holder: the NSA. The NSA website briefly profiles its “Network Geo-Location Technology” which as described here measures latency to build up a network latency topology map. This map can then be used to look up a computer based on the time it takes to connect to that computer. (This system can also be avoided using some kind of proxy service). The patent on this method of geo-location is one which the NSA has made available to be licensed for industry use.

Consider some of the possible uses for geo-location technologies (some taken from this article and the websites of Quova and Digital Element): Credit card companies or banks can use this software to detect fraud. Gaming operators can adopt this technology to comply with laws regarding trade practices over international and state borders. Sites such as eBay can use this to restrict which products are available in which locations (think Nazi paraphernalia and France). Hosts of digital worlds could keep track of the international transference of real money through in-game assets, and online providers of digital content can use it to comply with contracts that require them not to broadcast shows in certain areas (according to this article, major league baseball is a Quova customer that uses the product to make sure locally-broadcast games don’t lose their exclusivity by being unconditionally available online).

Aside from all of these applications for law enforcement, the companies that offer geo-location software market it for its ability to improve the user experience of the web. Namely, they cite the advantages of being able to give a user local search results, for example to guide a user to a store closest to them, and to target online advertising (ad-serving is currently the most common use of geo-location technology). Digital Element’s website claims that 25% of all Internet searches are local in nature, and that targeted ads have been shown to sell up to 30-40% more than general ads. Even if these numbers are exaggerated, it’s hard to argue that such location technologies have value to advertisers, search engines, and others.

The problem with geo-location technologies is that there’s a fine line between using general geographic data add desirable features or to make sure border-dependent laws are enforced on the web, and infringing on privacy and collecting personal information. Depending on the edition of Quova’s software, information obtained can be anywhere from simply geographic information in the basic edition up to much more in the security edition (“geographic information and confidence factors, demographic information, connection type, connection speed, IP routing type, AOL flag, ASN, carrier name, top-level domain, second-level domain, registering organization, a list of anonymizing proxies, hostnames, and routers”), and the services offered by Quova includes a variety of audit services for data collection (marketed as a means to help online business owners manage their business). We have to ask how much information should be available, and to whom.

While the current capabilities of both systems do raise questions about privacy and information availability, the question really comes up when we consider potential improvements on these technologies. While for marketing uses (among others) being able to locate some user / IP address to a general geographic area is sufficient, there are certainly other uses that would benefit from more exact geo-location technology such as emergency service for VoIP users, or the ability to more exactly locate someone committing fraud. The downside is that in different hands (or even in the hands of law enforcement officials depending on your point of view), the ability to accurately locate anyone using the internet is a dangerous tool, certainly one that you would not want to be commercially available. Using proxy servers may be an effective method of avoiding being located, it would also means the loss of all the positives of geo-locating technology.

The applications and benefits of geo-location technologies are quite substantial, and potentially provide a means to deal with many of the policy-related issues of internet regulation we’ve discussed this semester. As the technologies develop however, care needs to be taken with respect to the capabilities of such software available through general distribution.

This certainly isn’t a heated posting, but I am very bothered by the fact that some classmates are so dismal in their opinion about the surveillance operations being carried out by the National Security Agency (NSA).  I recall the point at which two students mentioned that even if there was verifiable proof that a large-scale terrorist attack had been averted, that they would still be unhappy about being wrongly monitored by the NSA.  The same people also mentioned that they had “serious issues” with appearing on surveillance footage of some recorder placed on a street corner.  To me, it seems that individuals who, to date, have not been threatened directly by some form of attack lack an appreciation for the protection mechanism that surveillance footage can serve as.  It is easy for us to sit in Robertson Hall and discuss how the NSA wiretapping is wrong, and how cameras on street corners are wrong because of privacy issues, but what is the real object we are trying to protect, our privacy or our lives, let’s be real.  Some official/employee contracted to look through suspect footage or listen to and analyze suspicious phone conversations is very unlikely to listen to the “smoochy-woochy” garble going on between anyone one of us and our boyfriend or girlfriend.  Put yourself in their position and imagine yourself stumbling onto a personal phone call/e-mail between two lovebirds or two sports fanatics.  In your quest to find important intelligence information, it would hardly be worth your time or of any interest for you to continue listening.  In light of the degradation of privacy, some people have called for an amendment to FISA to enable the government to be able to obtain warrants more quickly than they can now.  But even if this amendment does go through, the government will likely still surveil communications at a similar rate, and in doing so, FISA is doing little more than keeping a record of those being surveiled.  Does this all of a sudden make the surveillance less of a privacy concern to those who REALLY care?  No, of course not; these individuals are unlikely to feel more privatized while any form of eavesdropping is going on, and should just deal with the surveillance accordingly as it does decidedly more good than bad.

All of this is not to say that this system is completely exempt from having any vulnerabilities, it is simply to say that realistically, most people are not interested in your personal phone calls or clips of you scratching yourself on a street corner.  However, there are some concerns in my mind, many of which were brought up in class.  For example, word or phrase searching is likely a bad method for tracking terrorist activities since terrorists are now trying to employ the use of code words to cover their tracks.  And although I find it difficult to imagine that the NSA, with its magnanimous amount of funding and resources, is performing simple phrase comparisons on e-mails, it might be a better idea to analyze the traffic rather than the content.  This way instead of being fooled by tricky messages, they can become more familiar with the underlying communications network and possibly disrupt operations that way. 

And so while technically, the eavesdropping may or may not be soundly conducted, the practical implications it carries are immense and should be accepted.  What are the real policy issues associated with eavesdropping, privacy or longevity?  I think the distinction should be clear that living life should be more important to someone a small amount of privacy.

Many people in class on Tuesday and in their posts since have been uneasy with the idea of all phone calls or even all international phone calls being screened by a computer. Others felt that the stakes were too high, and that national security comes before any uneasiness we may feel. While the case in favor of national security has its clear points, our pleas for privacy seem to come simply from a vague discomfort or a blind appeal to freedoms granted in the bill of rights. In order to weigh these conflicting interests it is necessary to get a clear picture of the specific freedoms we sacrifice in the face of this “blanket wiretapping.”

If we assume that the technology and the intelligence, in both information and cleverness, of the NSA is enough that these wiretaps do have the potential to discover and avert potential threats, the question becomes how much is this computer scan violating our privacy. To help figure this out, it makes sense to try to understand how a conventional wiretap does violates privacy. In a conventional wiretap, another human being, more importantly a government agent is listening to and making record of the contents of a person’s call. There seem to be many clear reasons why we need to protect the innocent from such invasions. In order for relationships and interactions to exist in any real way, there needs to be some assurance that we can say things to another person without anyone else knowing or hearing. There is something lost, even if we have no intention of breaking a law or discussing breaking a law, when we know a conversation is being overheard by another person. Yet, we must be sure not to assume that a computer eavesdropping will have the same effect. A computer lacks consciousness (for now), and lacks the ability to judge. More importantly as the system has been described, it lacks the ability to make a record in most cases. There should be no reason why a person would feel intruded upon by a computer searching for keywords in his or her conversation. Yet, for some reason, there is still some uneasiness.

If we imagine the government using conventional wiretaps across every citizen there are clear and justified fears. A government that has that much knowledge of its people’s desires, intentions and actions is on its way to if not already draconian. Yet this danger only arises when all the information is synthesized and all the records are kept. If the NSA’s filtering system is effective, then 99.999% of phone conversations might as well have never even been listened to, and furthermore of those that are listened to and recorded, surely 90% ought to involve discussions of a grave threat to the every citizen in the nation. These numbers may be generous, and perhaps if the system is not so effective there is a danger of a draconian government, but if they can develop a system that has effectiveness on this level, our fears will become unjustified.

Our immediate discomfort from hearing of these secret blanket wiretaps is very understandable. Anytime the government does something without our knowledge the usual assumption is that they must be doing something somehow wrong. If we describe the surveillance as “wiretapping the whole nation,” it’s clear that this is simply too much power. However, if we assume that the NSA has developed an efficient system, describing it as secret blanket wiretaps seems to be misleading. The problem seems to be, and it seems will remain, that we will never be comfortable with this kind of surveillance until we fully understand it. If the government were to come forward and reveal the details of an effective system, there should be no reason to speak out against it, even if we don’t fully respect the dangers it seeks to prevent; the fact is that an effective computer filter does not invade our privacy in the way that a wiretap does. But is it still safe if we just to assume?

The problem is that we cannot be sure to what degree the federal government is intruding into our lives, simply because they have worked so hard to keep it secret. Perhaps if the government had been upfront about the plan, we may have reacted too rashly, and perhaps they knew this. There’s also the chance that being upfront about the system would allow people to circumvent it and render it useless. However, these concerns are not compelling enough to grant the federal government a blind trust. We seem to have fallen into a catch-22.  If we assume the system to be as it has been described, we should have no real argument against it. But since it remains shrouded in secrecy, our fears of a draconian government remain justified and important. Thus we must fight to expose the system, despite the fact that it may be vital to national secret while still respectful of our rights, because we simply don’t know yet.

More often than not, I am skeptical of American policy decisions that are justified with appeals to fear of terrorism. This is the case because such debates tend to be driven by appeals to sentimentality rather than sound reason (as several class members deftly pointed out in seminar), and because I believe politicians have exploited this. Nevertheless, I would like to play devil’s advocate this week and examine VoIP technology and NSA wiretapping in the context of being sensitive to concerns of terrorism.

I am torn about VoIP. From a purely technological point of view, I almost certainly think it should be allowed to flourish unregulated. The costs are lower than those of using a dedicated telephone line, and as broadband becomes increasingly ubiquitous, quality concerns should diminish. Furthermore, as I noted earlier in the semester, I think there is inherent flexibility and value from building diverse technologies over a single neutral platform. The ideal platform thus far seems to be the Internet, so I see no obvious reason to artificially keep the phone system separate and highly regulated.

Two aspects of VoIP, however, concern me with regard to issues of public safety. The first is 911 service as discussed in class. I would venture to guess that most people do not know the phone number for their local police or fire station, and it is certainly the case that many children would not know how to respond in cases of emergency. So long as VoIP technology does not allow for geolocation, it will be flawed as a means of primary communication. At the same time, cell phones are already widely used as substitutes for land lines by many young people and while they will connect to a local emergency response center, they also do not have geolocation, so perhaps not much is practically lost with VoIP.

The more troubling aspect is related to one that I brought up in class. Since the Internet is an open network, and operates as infrastructure for VoIP in the same way that the closed private networks of telephone carriers serve as infrastructure for the existing network, the risk of a malicious attack to voice service is much higher. Professor Felten cited some unbelievable statistic in class indicating the high rate of reliability with the existing telephone network. The Internet is certainly less reliable; but more concerning is its frequent vulnerability to being slowed to crawl by malicious worms and viruses. As a vital means of communication, this is dangerous to voice networks. Infrastructure attacks are often discussed as a starting point for terrorist attacks, and this only makes these easier. One could envision, for example, terrorists jamming VoIP lines with a cleverly written worm in advance of an attack.

With respect to the NSA wiretapping discussion in class, I was struck by two thoughts. My first was skepticism with some members of the class that the kind of dragnet searches suspected to be in use cannot really be very effective. On the other hand, the NSA does have vast resources (physical, financial and intellectual), so if they are really investing substantial amounts of money into these efforts, they probably have some understanding of the efficacy. I think that arguments in class premised around the fallibility of keywords searches are entirely misplaced since they grossly underestimate the likely sophistication of filtering algorithms in use.

Personally, I think that oversight is important for an agency like the NSA that operates in such secrecy. Given how many warrants have been approved, it seems unlikely that the oversight hinders functionality of the agency. I would support efforts to accelerate the pace with which the NSA can add new terms and names to their algorithms, since clearly most all requests are approved anyway. I am also of the opinion that the NSA should only need to obtain permission in order to set the filtering parameters on software— I personally have no problem with a computer scanning my communications so long as I have confidence that appropriate oversight is limiting the frequency with which these data get viewed by human agents. In the interests of public safety, I hardly find it unreasonable that some computer will scan some of my correspondence. While opponents often speak of the ‘slippery slope’ and steady erosion of privacy rights, I’m afraid I simply do not see this risk present in this particular case. It seems like a small price to pay for increased national security.

This week I want to talk about a current issue that deals with privacy and the protection of personal information, two topics that we focused on in previous classes.  By the end of 2006, the State Department hopes that all newly issued passports will be “e-passports.”  The US is also pushing other countries to issue these electronic passports.  What makes the e-passport different is that it has an embedded RFID chip which holds the travelers identification information, including name, birthday, and digital picture.  This is the same technology that is used at tollbooths, such as the familiar EZ-Pass .

When the US issued the first e-passports in January 2006, they opened a big can of worms with civil liberties groups.  The ACLU fears that these e-passports will be abused as tracking devices to keep tabs on the whereabouts of travelers on certain watch lists.  I don’t think that this concern holds much water, because the government can already track travel habits just by looking at ticket records as it is.  What concerns me is not a fear of big brother-tactics by the government, but rather the theft of my personal information by someone “skimming” the information off of my EZ-pass(port). To demonstrate security flaws in the new technology, a Dutch security firm successfully intercepted and decoded information on an e-passport.

I think that e-passports could definitely speed up the line at customs, and they do make sense as the next step in the evolution of identification.  They do raise privacy questions. If we are going to require e-passports with RFID chips, why doesn’t the government just implant RFID chips into travelers?  I have heard of some systems that use RFID chips to identify pets. Certainly this same technology could be applied to humans.  Just think, you would never have to worry about losing your passport or forgetting it at home.  At the same time, however, you would have a microchip inside you that could still be skimmed, and this information could be used to program another chip which could then be implanted in someone else who just successfully stole your identity.  As technology continues to evolve, privacy concerns and identity theft become more and more commonplace.  As we’ve discussed, it is up to the individual to protect his or her personal information in the face of technological innovation.