Several key issues seem to come into a debate of Internet regulation. First, is Goldsmith’s distinction between mandatory laws and default ones. The former are laws which for “paternalistic reasons” limit the behavior of individuals[1]. The latter are rules which private parties may override via contract. Goldsmith agrees that “Exceptionalist’s” claims[2] (to use Post’s language) make sense with respect to default laws. It is the mandatory laws, on which they disagree. Many of these laws are enacted to protect a public good or third parties – a need that does not disappear in the virtual world. As a disclaimer: I am making no normative claims about the need for regulation of any specific issue; I am merely considering how government might best go about it.
At this point, it seems silly to consider arguments in abstract. For the remainder of the article, I will use the issue of online gambling, which we discussed on Feb. 14th in class. This issue contains a mixture of moral (the effect on a gambler’s family), legal (gambling is illegal in most states), financial (potential loss of lottery revenue) and international concerns (most of these sites are located offshore). It well represents the complexity of internet-related issues likely to come before regulators. In class we discussed various methods of regulation and I will give my thoughts on most of them.
The most contentious was the direct regulation via technological means (i.e. filtering). Many (especially the technologically inclined) believe this to be infeasible. They argue that through encryption and the establishment of new protocols over the basic TCP/IP, one could transmit data without the possibility of detection and regulation[3]. While the argument is valid, it ignores the potential of technology combined with realworld legal tactics. The RIAA used both monitoring of P2P networks and high-profile lawsuits to curb student behavior[4]. From what I have seen, the RIAA has managed to curb the music sharing impulse on at least one college campus, despite the ingenuity and resourcefulness of students. If this example is any indication, technological monitoring coupled with legal action works. The real question is whether we, as a society, are willing to tolerate such costs (loss of privacy, threats of lawsuits). An adequate discussion of this will have to be postponed for some other time but it seems that if the RIAA tactics were employed not by a private entity, but by the US Government, the Orwellian overtones would be chilling.
Another solution that was suggested would be to deal diplomatically with countries that harbor online gambling websites. The canonical example is PartyPoker.com, a popular gambling site based in the UK. Considering the state of Anglo-US relations, the possibility of a diplomatic solution cannot be precluded. However, if a diplomatic solution succeeds, PartyPoker.com could easily move to a nation less amenable to use policy (many countries in the Caribbean, for instance, are fiercely protective of their tax shelters). Thus, diplomatic action would only unnecessarily cost the US political capital without substantive benefit. Dealing directly with the companies seems even less likely to succeed: it is hard to convince a company to cut off almost all of its US activities (Gambling from Nevada might still be legal) unless the US Government could threaten it with something substantially worse.
The best solution seems to be requiring credit card companies to freeze payments to online gambling sites. The intercepted money could be returned to the gambler’s accounts and the sites would quickly keep their users from betting. Logistically, this would not be difficult to coordinate: Mastercard and Visa comprise the overwhelming majority of the market, with almost all of the remainder is held by American Express and Discover. David Rosner[5] argues that this would (1) make merchants less trusting of credit card companies and (2) create an impetus for creating new payment companies that would not be subject to the law. The first concern is important to consider, as mistrust could result in substantial economic costs. However, it seems unlikely to occur: the law would be crafted to only affect internet gambling companies, and only halt payments to an updated list of specific accounts that the government provides. Most companies are pretty sure they are not involved in internet gambling (although a solid legal definition would be necessary). The author’s second concern (as well as the more general concern that internet gambling sites could use foreign intermediaries[6]) is unwarranted. Such services require a tremendous amount of capital (and trust) before being established and the industry is highly monopolized (as mentioned above). The law could also be written broadly enough to allow for the regulation of any company providing fund transfers. Lastly, if foreign front companies are created, the government can simply update the list of accounts to block. Ultimately, this regulation is designed only to significantly deter online gambling: by creating enough of a hassle, policymakers hope to deter users from becoming addicted.
Both Post and Goldsmith establish extreme opposition points against which their more nuanced arguments fair better[7]. Ultimately the solution will lie somewhere in between these extremes. For more serious issues like Child Pornography, government monitoring and high profile prosecutions might be warranted. However, for issues less pressing , less drastic measures are required. If online gambling is any indication, establishing barriers to quick electronic fund transfers presents a valuable tool to regulators.
[1] Goldsmith, J. L. “Against Cyberanarchy” 65 Chicago Law Review 1199 (1998).
[2] Post D. G. “Against ‘Against Cyberanarchy’” 17 Berkley Technology Law Journal 1365 (2002)
[3] see “Technical filtering of Internet content” by Jeff Dwoskin for a much more thorough explanation
[4] see “Internet Gambling: Lessons from P2P” by Avi for a chronology of P2P at Princeton
[5] “Posting Regarding Class on February 14.”
[6] “More on internet gambling regulation” by Martin.
[7] This has also been noted in “Post’s Scale and Effects” by NKW.